Unemployment and the 'Labour-Management Conspiracy.'
We study a model in which management and a union bargain over a rule that will later determine the level of employment, and over a wage. The government then chooses an output or an employment subsidy. An exogenous natural turnover rate in the unionised sector creates unemployment whenever the union wage exceeds the competitive wage. Government intervention can increase both the equilibrium amount of unemployment and worsen the intersectoral allocation of labour, because of the induced change in the endogenous wage. Unemployment weakens but does not eliminate the possibility of a "labour-management conspiracy".
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Volume (Year): 110 (2000)
Issue (Month): 460 (January)
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- Karp, Larry & Paul, Thierry, 1998.
"Unemployment and the "Labour-Management Conspiracy","
Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series
qt4w19p9qp, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
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