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Do Turnover Costs Protect Insiders?

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  • Vetter, Henrik
  • Andersen, Torben M

Abstract

The ability of insiders to extract rents associated with exogenous turnover costs is addressed in a dynamic model. The higher these rents, the higher is the incentives for outsiders to obtain future insider status and, thus, to underbid current insiders. As a consequence, there is a lower limit to the number of insiders that can avoid entrance of outsiders and the insiders cannot in each period obtain a rent equal to the turnover costs. The insider model never explains a lower but may result in a higher employment level than in the case where all workers are wage-takers. Copyright 1994 by Royal Economic Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Vetter, Henrik & Andersen, Torben M, 1994. "Do Turnover Costs Protect Insiders?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(422), pages 124-130, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:104:y:1994:i:422:p:124-30
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Marco Guerrazzi, 2020. "Wage and employment determination in a dynamic insider–outsider model," Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 1-23, January.
    2. Assar Lindbeck & Dennis J. Snower, 2001. "Insiders versus Outsiders," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(1), pages 165-188, Winter.
    3. Pilar Díaz‐Vázquez & Dennis J. Snower, 2003. "Can Insider Power Affect Employment?," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 4(2), pages 139-150, May.
    4. Díaz-Vázquez, Pilar & Snower, Dennis J., 2003. "Can insider power affect employment?," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy 2992, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    5. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pc:p:2985-3028 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Diaz-Vazquez, Pilar & Snower, Dennis, 2006. "On-the-Job Learning and the Effects of Insider Power," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 317-341, June.
    7. Torben Andersen & Henrik Vetter, 1995. "Equilibrium youth unemployment," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 1-10, February.
    8. Lever, Marcel H. C. & van Werkhooven, Jolanda M., 1996. "Insider power, market power, firm size and wages: Evidence from Dutch manufacturing industries," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 93-107, August.
    9. Lewin-Solomons, S., 2003. "Market-induced Asset Specificity: Redefining the Hold-up Problem," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0304, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    10. Diaz-Vazquez, Pilar & Snower, Dennis J., 2002. "On-the-Job Training and the Effects of Insider Power," IZA Discussion Papers 586, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    11. Kai-Uwe Kuuhn & A. Jorge Padilla, 2002. "Union Power, Replacement and Labour Market Dynamics," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(479), pages 317-343, April.

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