IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ecb/fsrart/201700021.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Overcoming Non-Performing Loan Market Failures with Transaction Platforms

Author

Listed:
  • Fell, John
  • Grodzicki, Maciej
  • Krušec, Dejan
  • Martin, Reiner
  • O’Brien, Edward

Abstract

When banks judge that more value can be extracted by offering non-performing loans (NPLs) for sale rather than working them out themselves, potential investors cannot be sure that the credit quality of the assets is as good as the banks portray it to be. Such information asymmetries in the NPL market drive a wedge between the prices that investors are prepared to pay for NPLs and the prices that banks are prepared to sell them for. While information asymmetries can be overcome through investor due diligence, this requires specialist expertise and the costs of valuing NPL portfolios can be very high. As few investors have the resources to absorb such costs, barriers to entering the market are compounded. This appears to explain why the euro area NPL markets display the features of an oligopsony, a situation where there is a concentration of market power among a limited number of investors, which pushes traded prices even lower. At the same time, potential NPL investors can face coordination challenges when debtors have multiple loans with different banks. In such situations, investors must face the prospect of competing with other creditors for the debtor’s resources. While coordination between banks for common exposures may alleviate this problem, this too can be costly, weighing further on market prices. By offering the prospect of greater transparency in NPL markets, fostering wider investor participation and addressing coordination issues, NPL transaction platforms could help in overcoming all three of these market failures. The attendant improvement in market liquidity would allow banks to achieve better prices for NPL sales, preserve their capital and mitigate financial stability risks. This special feature outlines the desirable features of NPL transaction platforms and discusses their operational implementation. JEL Classification: G00

Suggested Citation

  • Fell, John & Grodzicki, Maciej & Krušec, Dejan & Martin, Reiner & O’Brien, Edward, 2017. "Overcoming Non-Performing Loan Market Failures with Transaction Platforms," Financial Stability Review, European Central Bank, vol. 2.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecb:fsrart:2017:0002:1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.ecb.europa.eu//pub/pdf/fsr/art/ecb.fsrart201711_01.en.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Tatarici Luminita Roxana & Kubinschi Matei Nicolae & Barnea Dinu, 2020. "Determinants of Non-Performing Loans for the EEC Region. A Financial Stability Perspective," Management & Marketing, Sciendo, vol. 15(4), pages 621-642, December.
    2. Péter Fáykiss & Erzsébet-Judit Rariga & Márton Zsigó, 2019. "Portfolio Cleaning of Problem Project Loans in Hungary – Experiences Related to the Systemic Risk Buffer, as a Targeted Macroprudential Instrument," Financial and Economic Review, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary), vol. 18(3), pages 52-82.
    3. Ivan Huljak & Reiner Martin & Diego Moccero & Cosimo Pancaro, 2022. "Do non-performing loans matter for bank lending and the business cycle in euro area countries?," Journal of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(1), pages 1050-1080, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    bank profitability; debt sustainability; financial stability; political uncertainty; repricing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G00 - Financial Economics - - General - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecb:fsrart:2017:0002:1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Official Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/emieude.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.