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Revisiting Nash wages negotiations in matching models


  • Samir Amine

    () (University of Quebec en Outaouais and CIRANO Montréal Canada)

  • Pedro Lages dos santos

    () (University of Le Havre)

  • Sylvain Baumann

    () (University of Le Havre)

  • Fabrice Valognes

    () (University of Caen)


In labour economics theory, wage negotiations use to rely on a Symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution. The aim of this study is to show that this kind of solution may be not relevant. Indeed, in a matching model framework, the comparison with the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution suggests that a reflection should systematically be made with respect to the negotiation power of each agent (a same ascertainment has been pointed out by McDonald and Solow (1981)). Finally, we characterize the Kalai-Smorodinsky in the job matching setting.

Suggested Citation

  • Samir Amine & Pedro Lages dos santos & Sylvain Baumann & Fabrice Valognes, 2009. "Revisiting Nash wages negotiations in matching models," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(4), pages 3203-3213.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00746

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Peter Lorentzen & John McMillan & Romain Wacziarg, 2008. "Death and development," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 81-124, June.
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    More about this item


    Matching; bargaining solutions; public policy.;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • J6 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers


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