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Revisiting Nash wages negotiations in matching models

Listed author(s):
  • Samir Amine


    (University of Quebec en Outaouais and CIRANO Montréal Canada)

  • Pedro Lages dos santos


    (University of Le Havre)

  • Sylvain Baumann


    (University of Le Havre)

  • Fabrice Valognes


    (University of Caen)

In labour economics theory, wage negotiations use to rely on a Symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution. The aim of this study is to show that this kind of solution may be not relevant. Indeed, in a matching model framework, the comparison with the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution suggests that a reflection should systematically be made with respect to the negotiation power of each agent (a same ascertainment has been pointed out by McDonald and Solow (1981)). Finally, we characterize the Kalai-Smorodinsky in the job matching setting.

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Article provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 29 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 3203-3213

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Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00746
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