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L’externalisation de la fonction comptable à l’épreuve de la théorie du signal

Author

Listed:
  • Guillaume Chanson

    (PRISM Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)

  • Véronique Rouges

    (PRISM Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)

Abstract

(VF)Malgré les dispositifs légaux, il demeure une asymétrie d’information quant à la qualité des états financiers obligatoires. L’externalisation de la fonction comptable peut jouer un rôle de signal, en limitant les possibilités de gestion des données comptables. Nous construisons un cadre théorique s’appuyant sur la théorie du signal afin d’expliquer l’externalisation de la fonction comptable. Nous le testons sur un échantillon de 123 entreprises. Trois hypothèses sont corroborées : les entreprises cotées et fortement endettées réalisent plus souvent leur comptabilité en externe à l’inverse des entreprises ayant recours au co-commissariat.(VA)Despite legal constraints, there is an information asymmetry concerning the quality of financial statements. The outsourcing of accounting services may work as a signal, in as far as it sets a limit on earnings management.We build a theoretical framework based on the signaling theory to explain the outsourcing of accounting services. We test the theoretical frame on a sample of 123 French companies. Three hypotheses are corroborated: listed and highly indebted companies use external accounting services more frequently; companies with two external auditors do not.

Suggested Citation

  • Guillaume Chanson & Véronique Rouges, 2012. "L’externalisation de la fonction comptable à l’épreuve de la théorie du signal," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 15(3), pages 95-107, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:15:y:2012:i:3:p:95-107.
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    Keywords

    théorie du signal; externalisation; comptabilité; gestion des données comptables; signaling theory; outsourcing; accounting services; earnings management.;

    JEL classification:

    • M1 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration
    • M4 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting

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