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Réglementation du travail et structure financière:Théorie et preuve empirique - Employment laws and capital structure:Theory and empirical evidence

Listed author(s):
  • Pramuan Bunkanwanicha


    (ESCP Europe)

  • Christophe Moussu


    (ESCP Europe)

Registered author(s):

    (VF)Cet article révèle une association négative forte entre la réglementation du travail et l’endettement financier des entreprises, sur un large échantillon d’entreprises cotées des 21 pays les plus riches de l’OCDE. L’hypothèse développée est que la réglementation du travail a une incidence sur la rigidité de l’emploi et donc sur la structure de charges des entreprises. Cette rigidité se traduit par un levier opérationnel plus important, qui induit les entreprises à abaisser leur niveau d’endettement. Les résultats sont robustes à l’introduction de variables institutionnelles précédemment utilisées dans la littérature, notamment les lois protégeant les syndicats, les actionnaires minoritaires et les créanciers.(VA)This article reveals the existence of a strong negative relationship between employment laws and the financial leverage of firms. Our study uses a large sample of listed firms from the 21 high-income OECD countries. Our hypothesis is that employment laws have an impact on labor-market rigidity and therefore the cost structure of firms. This increased rigidity translates into higher operational leverage for firms, enticing them to decrease their financial leverage. Results are robust to the introduction of several institutional variables used in the literature, in particular the laws protecting unions, minority shareholders and creditors.

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    Article provided by in its journal Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie.

    Volume (Year): 15 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 1 (June)
    Pages: 27-42

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    Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:15:y:2012:i:1:p:27-42.
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