Trade and the political economy of standards
This paper reviews the emerging literature on the political economy of public standards in an open economy to explain why standards are set at certain levels, and how this affects trade. We use a simple framework to illustrate how interest groups may influence the standard-setting process, and which factors may affect the political equilibria. We analyze the relation between trade and standards, and their potential protectionist nature. We argue that standards may act as barriers or catalysts to trade, that both under- or over-standardization may occur, and that standards may serve as protectionist instruments, or not.
Volume (Year): 11 (2012)
Issue (Month): 03 (July)
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