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Incumbency Effects in a Comparative Perspective: Evidence from Brazilian Mayoral Elections

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  • De Magalhaes, Leandro

Abstract

High rerunning rates among incumbents and among the two major parties allow studies of U.S. incumbency advantage to bypass the selection problem of who chooses to rerun. In countries where rerunning is not widespread among individuals or parties, estimation using methods developed for the United States may result in a sample selection bias. In countries with party switching, there may be a disconnect between party and individual estimates. This article proposes a definition of incumbency advantage that is valid for countries that present any of these characteristics and that is valid for cross-country comparison: the effect of incumbency for an individual politician on the unconditional probability of winning. I illustrate the issues raised in this article with evidence from Brazilian mayoral elections.

Suggested Citation

  • De Magalhaes, Leandro, 2015. "Incumbency Effects in a Comparative Perspective: Evidence from Brazilian Mayoral Elections," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(1), pages 113-126, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:polals:v:23:y:2015:i:01:p:113-126_01
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    Cited by:

    1. Sara M. Constantino & Alicia D. Cooperman & Thiago M. Q. Moreira, 2021. "Voting in a global pandemic: Assessing dueling influences of Covid‐19 on turnout," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 102(5), pages 2210-2235, September.
    2. Jeremy Bowles & Benjamin Marx, 2022. "Turnover and Accountability in Africa's Parliaments," Sciences Po Economics Publications (main) hal-03873800, HAL.
    3. Kaisa Kotakorpi & Panu Poutvaara & Marko Tervio, 2013. "Returns to office in national and local politics," Discussion Papers 86, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    4. Ercio Andres Munoz, 2021. "Incumbency advantage, money, and campaigns: A note on some suggestive evidence from Chile," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 41(3), pages 1203-1211.
    5. Andre Assumpcao & Julio Trecenti, 2020. "Judicial Favoritism of Politicians: Evidence from Small Claims Court," Papers 2001.00889, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2020.
    6. Marco Alberto De Benedetto, 2014. "Incumbency Advantage at Municipal Elections in Italy: A Quasi-Experimental Approach," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 1408, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
    7. Lewis, Blane D. & Nguyen, Hieu T.M. & Hendrawan, Adrianus, 2020. "Political accountability and public service delivery in decentralized Indonesia: Incumbency advantage and the performance of second term mayors," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    8. Song, B.K., 2020. "The effect of public financing on candidate reemergence and success in elections," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    9. Ari Hyytinen & Jaakko Meriläinen & Tuukka Saarimaa & Otto Toivanen & Janne Tukiainen, 2018. "When does regression discontinuity design work? Evidence from random election outcomes," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), pages 1019-1051, July.
    10. Galasso, Vincenzo & Dano, Kevin & Ferlenga, Francesco & LePennec, Caroline & Pons, Vincent, 2022. "Coordination and Incumbency Advantage in Multi-Party Systems - Evidence from French Elections," CEPR Discussion Papers 17600, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Leandro de Magalhaes & Salomo Hirvonen, 2019. "The Incumbent-Challenger Advantage and the Winner-Runner-up Advantage," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 19/710, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    12. De Magalhaes, Leandro, 2015. "Incumbency Effects in a Comparative Perspective: Evidence from Brazilian Mayoral Elections," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(1), pages 113-126, January.
    13. KAREKURVE-RAMACHANDRA, VARUN & Singh, Sudhir & Stommes, Drew, 2024. "Political Exit: The Unintended Effects of Electoral Rules," OSF Preprints d7xsk_v1, Center for Open Science.
    14. Sonia Bhalotra & Irma Clots-Figueras & Lakshmi Iyer, "undated". "Pathbreakers? Women’s Electoral Success and Future Political Participation," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-277, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    15. Leandro De Magalhaes & Isabel Spirgel-Sinclair, 2021. "Could Regression Discontinuity estimates of incumbency e ects help monitor parliamentary elections? Evidence from Malawi," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 21/741, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    16. Carlos Di Bonifacio & Guido Merzoni & Federico Trombetta, 2024. "Incumbency Effect in Competitive Autocracies: evidence from Venezuela," DISEIS - Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo dis2402, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo (DISEIS).
    17. Leandro De Magalhaes & Salomo Hirvonen, 2021. "A second chance elsewhere. Re-running for parliament after a close race defeat: UK vs US," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 21/744, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    18. Bartnicki, Sławomir & Alimowski, Maciej & Górecki, Maciej A., 2022. "The anomalous electoral advantage: Evidence from over 17,000 mayoral candidacies in Poland," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • J00 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - General

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