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Patent Protection, Optimal Licensing, And Innovation With Endogenous Entry

Author

Listed:
  • Suzuki, Keishun

Abstract

How does patent policy affect innovation when patent licensing is crucial for firms? To address this question, the present study incorporates voluntary patent licensing between an innovator and followers, as discussed in the literature of industrial organization, into a dynamic general equilibrium model. Unlike previous studies, both the licensing fee and the number of licensees are endogenously determined by the innovator’s maximization and the free-entry condition. Using this model, we show that strong patent protection does not always enhance innovation, economic growth, and welfare. Furthermore, the extended analysis provides the policy implication that the effect of patent policy depends on how difficult further innovation is without patent licensing of the current leading technology.

Suggested Citation

  • Suzuki, Keishun, 2020. "Patent Protection, Optimal Licensing, And Innovation With Endogenous Entry," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 24(8), pages 2033-2059, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:macdyn:v:24:y:2020:i:8:p:2033-2059_7
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Suzuki, Keishun & Kishimoto, Shin, 2025. "Leading patent breadth, endogenous quality choice, and economic growth," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    2. Keishun Suzuki, 2020. "Competition, patent protection, and innovation with heterogeneous firms in an endogenous market structure," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(3), pages 729-750, June.
    3. Kishimoto, Shin & Suzuki, Keishun, 2021. "Growth and Welfare Effects of Interventions in Patent Licensing Negotiations," MPRA Paper 108009, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Suzuki, Keishun, 2020. "Patent Puzzle, Inflation, and Internal Financial Constraint," MPRA Paper 101937, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Keishun Suzuki & Shin Kishimoto, 2023. "Leading Patent Breadth, Endogenous Quality Choice, and Economic Growth," ISER Discussion Paper 1205, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
    6. Luping Bao, 2025. "The mechanism of regional collaborative innovation," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 16(2), pages 10909-10933, June.
    7. Ting Lei & Ping Xie, 2024. "RETRACTED ARTICLE: Fostering Enterprise Innovation: The Impact of China’s Pilot Free Trade Zones," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 15(3), pages 10412-10441, September.
    8. Fei Yan & Hong-Zhuan Chen & Sahin Telli & Zhi-Chao Zhang, 2024. "Strategic Licensing Model Choice with Network Effects in a Dynamic Duopoly," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 611-641, July.
    9. Haoyang Song & Jianhua Hou & Yang Zhang, 2022. "Patent protection: does it promote or inhibit the patented technological knowledge diffusion?," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 127(5), pages 2351-2379, May.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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