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On the optimal specificity of legal rules

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  • FON, VINCY
  • PARISI, FRANCESCO

Abstract

Lawmakers can choose to craft laws with different levels of detail to guide judges in their decision-making process, incorporating rules or standards into the laws they write. The optimal degree of specificity of legal rules under different environmental conditions and the functionality of these rules or standards are the subjects of the present study. A basic model of optimal specificity of laws is presented, clarifying the relevance of legal obsolescence and volume of litigation in the optimal choice. We then consider the important influence of codification style, judges’ specialization, and complexity of reality on the optimal choice of legislative instrument. The implications of our results are then reexamined in light of the more complex institutional reality that characterizes contemporary legislative processes in various areas of the law.

Suggested Citation

  • Fon, Vincy & Parisi, Francesco, 2007. "On the optimal specificity of legal rules," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 147-164, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jinsec:v:3:y:2007:i:02:p:147-164_00
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Goodhue, Rachael E. & McCarthy, Nancy, 2011. "Liability Rules, Collective Organizations and the Provision of Food Safety," 2011 International Congress, August 30-September 2, 2011, Zurich, Switzerland 114620, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    2. Garoupa, Nuno & Obidzinski, Marie, 2006. "The Scope of Punishment: An Economic Theory of Harm-Based vs. Act-Based Sanctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5899, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Douglas Whitman, 2009. "The rules of abstraction," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 22(1), pages 21-41, March.
    4. Shay Lavie & Tal Ganor & Yuval Feldman, 2020. "Adjusting legal standards," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 49(1), pages 33-53, February.
    5. Castañeda Dower, Paul & Pfutze, Tobias, 2013. "Specificity of control: The case of Mexico's ejido reform," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 13-33.
    6. Bertrand Crettez & Bruno Deffains & Régis Deloche, 2009. "On the optimal complexity of law and legal rules harmonization," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 129-142, April.
    7. Giovanni Maggi & Robert W. Staiger, 2008. "On the Role and Design of Dispute Settlement Procedures in International Trade Agreements," NBER Working Papers 14067, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Franziska Weber, 2013. "European integration assessed in the light of the ‘rules vs. standards debate’," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 187-210, April.
    9. Zdybel, Karol B., 2024. "Norms among heterogeneous agents: a rational-choice model," ILE Working Paper Series 78, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
    10. Mario J. Rizzo, 2021. "Abstract rules for complex systems," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 209-227, December.
    11. Yoshinobu Zasu & Ikumi Sato, 2012. "Providing credibility around the world: effective devices of the Cape Town Convention," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 577-601, June.
    12. John Zhuang Liu & Xueyao Li, 2019. "Legal Techniques for Rationalizing Biased Judicial Decisions: Evidence from Experiments with Real Judges," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(3), pages 630-670, September.
    13. Peter Grajzl, 2011. "A property rights approach to legislative delegation," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 177-200, June.

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