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Extraordinary Antitakeover Provisions and Insider Ownership Structure: The Case of Converting Savings and Loans

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  • Boyle, Glenn W.
  • Carter, Richard B.
  • Stover, Roger D.

Abstract

Insider ownership and antitakeover provisions both affect a firm's vulnerability to takeover, its value, and its managers' incentives and utility. We examine the simultaneous determination of insider ownership and takeover protection using data from mutual savings and loan associations converting to stock form. At low levels of insider ownership, we find that ownership is negatively related to the number of extraordinary antitakeover provisions; at higher levels, ownership is not related to the number of antitakeover provisions. These results are consistent with insider entrenchment.

Suggested Citation

  • Boyle, Glenn W. & Carter, Richard B. & Stover, Roger D., 1998. "Extraordinary Antitakeover Provisions and Insider Ownership Structure: The Case of Converting Savings and Loans," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(2), pages 291-304, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:33:y:1998:i:02:p:291-304_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Kenneth A. Carow & Steven R. Cox & Dianne M. Roden, 2007. "The Role of Insider Influence in Mutual‐to‐Stock Conversions," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(6), pages 1285-1304, September.
    2. Danielson, Morris G. & Karpoff, Jonathan M., 1998. "On the uses of corporate governance provisions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 347-371, December.
    3. Houmes, Robert & Chira, Inga, 2015. "The effect of ownership structure on the price earnings ratio — returns anomaly," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 140-147.
    4. João Paulo Vieito & António Cerqueira & Elísio Brandão & Walayet A. Khan, 2009. "Executive Compensation: the Finance Perspective," Portuguese Journal of Management Studies, ISEG, Universidade de Lisboa, vol. 0(1), pages 3-32.
    5. Yuan George Shan, 2019. "Managerial ownership, board independence and firm performance," Accounting Research Journal, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 32(2), pages 203-220, July.
    6. Al Dah, Bilal & Michael, Amir & Dixon, Rob, 2017. "Antitakeover provisions and CEO monetary benefits: Revisiting the E-index," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 992-1004.
    7. Omar Al Farooque & Tony Van Zijl & Keitha Dunstan & AKM Waresul Karim, 2007. "Corporate Governance in Bangladesh: Link between Ownership and Financial Performance," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(6), pages 1453-1468, November.

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