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A Nonhypothetical Ranking and Auction Mechanism for Novel Products

Author

Listed:
  • McAdams, Callie
  • Palma, Marco A.
  • Hall, Charles
  • Ishdorj, Ariun

Abstract

Preferences for pomegranates, including some novel pomegranate varieties, were evaluated using an experimental auction and nonhypothetical preference ranking mechanism. Additional information on the taste and health benefits of the products was provided to mimic the information-gathering process on novel products. Product familiarity, product information, and reference prices were key factors in explaining willingness to pay for the included novel products. Results from the auction and nonhypothetical preference ranking procedures were divergent. Furthermore, interactions were detected between information treatments and product characteristics.

Suggested Citation

  • McAdams, Callie & Palma, Marco A. & Hall, Charles & Ishdorj, Ariun, 2013. "A Nonhypothetical Ranking and Auction Mechanism for Novel Products," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(1), pages 35-52, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jagaec:v:45:y:2013:i:01:p:35-52_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Collart, Alba J. & Palma, Marco A., 2014. "What Motivates Individuals to Participate in Economic Experiments? A Latent Class Analysis with Unobserved Heterogeneity," 2014 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2014, Minneapolis, Minnesota 170401, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    2. Chavez, Daniel & Palma, Marco, 2015. "Off the reservation: Pushing the bounds of rationality in experimental auctions," 2015 AAEA & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, July 26-28, San Francisco, California 202164, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    3. Lim, Siew & Wachenheim, Cheryl, 2022. "Predicted enrollment in alternative attribute Conservation Reserve Program contracts," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 117(C).
    4. Kassas, Bachir & Palma, Marco A. & Zhang, Yvette, 2016. "The role of incentives on preference revelations in auctions versus rankings," Journal of choice modelling, Elsevier, vol. 20(C), pages 73-85.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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