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The Enforcement Problem in Coercive Bargaining: Interstate Conflict over Rebel Support in Civil Wars

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  • Schultz, Kenneth A.

Abstract

This article explores the strategic problems that arise when a state seeks to use military force to compel changes in another state's policies. Although the costs associated with military action mean that there generally exist compromises that both sides prefer to conflict, bargaining may fail if such deals are not enforceable in the face of temptations to renege on policy concessions. This study develops a model that shows that inefficient conflict can occur when states bargain over policies that one of them can change unilaterally and covertly. I then show that this theory is useful for understanding a common source of international conflict: conflicts that arise when one state supports rebel groups engaged in a civil war with another state. Episodes of rebel support are associated with a substantial increase in the risk of interstate militarized disputes, the lethality of these disputes, and the likelihood of repeated violence. Agreements to limit rebel support are unlikely to reduce interstate violence unless they are coupled with concessions by the target state and/or monitoring mechanisms, both of which are shown theoretically to mitigate the enforcement problem.

Suggested Citation

  • Schultz, Kenneth A., 2010. "The Enforcement Problem in Coercive Bargaining: Interstate Conflict over Rebel Support in Civil Wars," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(2), pages 281-312, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:64:y:2010:i:02:p:281-312_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Philip Arena & Anna O. Pechenkina, 2016. "External Subsidies and Lasting Peace," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 60(7), pages 1278-1311, October.
    2. J. Andrés Gannon & Erik Gartzke & Jon R. Lindsay & Peter Schram, 2024. "The Shadow of Deterrence: Why Capable Actors Engage in Contests Short of War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 68(2-3), pages 230-268, March.
    3. Mercier, Marion & Silve, Arthur & Tremblay-Auger, Benjamin, 2023. "Building Reputation: Proxy Wars and Transnational Identities," IZA Discussion Papers 16340, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Nils W. Metternich & Shahryar Minhas & Michael D. Ward, 2017. "Firewall? or Wall on Fire? A Unified Framework of Conflict Contagion and the Role of Ethnic Exclusion," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 61(6), pages 1151-1173, July.
    5. Wakako Maekawa & Barış Arı & Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, 2019. "UN involvement and civil war peace agreement implementation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(3), pages 397-416, March.
    6. World Bank, 2020. "Violence without Borders," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 33330, December.
    7. Arzu Kibris, 2021. "The geo-temporal evolution of violence in civil conflicts: A micro analysis of conflict diffusion on a new event data set," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 58(5), pages 885-899, September.
    8. Hans-Inge Langø, 2023. "Intervention, war expansion, and the international sources of civil war," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 40(3), pages 304-324, May.
    9. Elena V McLean & Kaisa H Hinkkainen & Luis De la Calle & Navin A Bapat, 2018. "Economic sanctions and the dynamics of terrorist campaigns," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 35(4), pages 378-401, July.
    10. Ji Yeon Hong & Wenhui Yang, 2022. "Conditional cross-border effects of terrorism in China," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 39(3), pages 266-290, May.
    11. David B. Carter & Paul Poast, 2017. "Why Do States Build Walls? Political Economy, Security, and Border Stability," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 61(2), pages 239-270, February.

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