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Beyond two-level games: domestic–international interaction in the intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiations

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  • Knopf, Jeffrey W.

Abstract

The currently popular concept of two-level games suffers from certain shortcomings as an approach to studying the interaction between domestic- and international-level variables. In the two-level game approach, different types of domestic-international interaction are insufficiently distinguished, and special dynamics of cases involving third parties like military allies are not adequately recognized. This article modifies the two-level game concept by specifying three forms of domestic-international interaction and adding a third level to the framework. The utility of this new “three-and-three†approach is illustrated through analysis of the U.S.-Soviet negotiations on intermediaterange nuclear forces in the 1980s. This analysis generates new hypotheses suggesting that domestic actors can shape the agenda for international negotiations and that certain forms of domestic-international interaction tend to bring about large changes in the positions of the principal parties to a negotiation.

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  • Knopf, Jeffrey W., 1993. "Beyond two-level games: domestic–international interaction in the intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiations," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 47(4), pages 599-628, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:47:y:1993:i:04:p:599-628_02
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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Pierre P. Langlois & Catherine C. Langlois, 2004. "Holding Out for Concession: The Quest for Gain in the Negotiation of International Agreements," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(3), pages 261-293, April.
    2. Diana Panke & Gurur Polat & Franziska Hohlstein, 2021. "Satisfied or not? Exploring the interplay of individual, country and international organization characteristics for negotiation success," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 403-429, April.

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