IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/intorg/v44y1990i01p25-54_00.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Neither MITI nor America: the political economy of capital liberalization in Japan

Author

Listed:
  • Encarnation, Dennis J.
  • Mason, Mark

Abstract

Compared with Japan, no other industrialized country has so adamantly denied foreign investors direct access to its domestic markets. Japan continued to deny such market access until domestic constituencies finally championed foreign demands and successfully pressured a reluctant state for concessions. The initiative for these concessions came neither from Japan's principal government negotiators in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) nor from public policymakers in America. Rather, it came from American and other multinational corporations (MNCs) seeking to exploit imperfect markets for the technology and related assets which they alone controlled and which a few Japanese oligopolists demanded. These local oligopolists served as manipulative intermediaries between MNCs and the nationstate and in that position determined both the timing and the substance of their country's long march toward capital liberalization. Between the legislation of capital controls in 1950 and the de jure elimination of those controls in 1980, what began as an extension of limited concessions to individual MNCs, eventually aided by small regulatory loopholes, gradually encompassed all foreigners supplying broad product groups. During the intervening thirty years, the MNCs examined in this article— including Coca-Cola, IBM, Texas Instruments, and the “big three†U.S. automakers —finally gained limited access to the Japanese market. For them, the formal liberalizations of the late 1960s and early 1970s proved significant, but not always decisive, as Japanese oligopolists moved both to replace public regulations with private restrictions and to mesh their ongoing political influence domestically with their emerging economic power internationally. Thus, de facto liberalization proceeded slowly and unevenly, at least through 1980, and foreign direct investment in Japan continued to languish. What capital liberalization did occur had little to do with the pressures exerted on MITI and the Japanese state by the U.S. government and the international organizations that America then controlled. Rather, American diplomacy proved successful in forcing concessions from Japan only when it was backed up both by the economic power of American MNCs and by the active support of Japanese business.

Suggested Citation

  • Encarnation, Dennis J. & Mason, Mark, 1990. "Neither MITI nor America: the political economy of capital liberalization in Japan," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(1), pages 25-54, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:44:y:1990:i:01:p:25-54_00
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S002081830000463X/type/journal_article
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. David E. Weinstein, 1997. "Foreign Direct Investment and Keiretsu: Rethinking U.S. and Japanese Policy," NBER Chapters, in: The Effects of US Trade Protection and Promotion Policies, pages 81-116, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Hideki Yamawaki, 2004. "Who Survives in Japan? An Empirical Analysis of European and U.S. Multinational Firms in Japanese Manufacturing Industries," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 135-153, June.
    3. Yonekura, Akira & Gallhofer, Sonja & Haslam, Jim, 2012. "Accounting disclosure, corporate governance and the battle for markets: The case of trade negotiations between Japan and the U.S," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 312-331.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:44:y:1990:i:01:p:25-54_00. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kirk Stebbing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/ino .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.