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The long arm of justice: U.S. structural power and international banking

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  • Emmenegger, Patrick

Abstract

How much authority can sovereign states exercise over international banking in times of financial globalization? While most literature on international finance is rather pessimistic, this article argues that in case of US law enforcement, this pessimistic view is increasingly erroneous. The reason is that US authorities can take advantage of international banks’ structural dependence on access to the dollar-based financial system to force banks into punitive agreements or to plead guilty in case of criminal offenses. Using the conflict between the USA and Swiss banks over tax evasion by US persons, this article demonstrates that banks in the liberal economic system can no longer survive without access to the US-controlled, dollar-based financial system, thus giving the USA structural power over banks. In addition, it is shown that US structural power can be used strategically during negotiation processes to apply pressure on banks. Finally, while the use of this structural power was originally restricted to smaller banks, whose collapse would not endanger the world economy, US authorities have recently learnt to manage market expectations in a way that allows them to also target banks that were previously considered “too big to jail.â€

Suggested Citation

  • Emmenegger, Patrick, 2015. "The long arm of justice: U.S. structural power and international banking," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 17(3), pages 473-493, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:buspol:v:17:y:2015:i:03:p:473-493_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Andreas Georg Scherer & Andreas Rasche & Guido Palazzo & André Spicer, 2016. "Managing for Political Corporate Social Responsibility: New Challenges and Directions for PCSR 2.0," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 273-298, May.
    2. Lips, Wouter, 2018. "Great powers in global tax governance: a comparison of the US role in the CRS and BEPS," SocArXiv ewd3j, Center for Open Science.
    3. Christine Trampusch & Florian Fastenrath, 2021. "States' interests as limits to the power of finance: Regulatory reforms in early local government financialization in the US and UK," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(2), pages 245-261, April.
    4. Paul Almond & Judith van Erp, 2020. "Regulation and governance versus criminology: Disciplinary divides, intersections, and opportunities," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 14(2), pages 167-183, April.
    5. Culpepper Pepper D., 2015. "Structural power and political science in the post-crisis era," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(3), pages 391-409, October.
    6. Winecoff William Kindred, 2015. "Structural power and the global financial crisis: a network analytical approach," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(3), pages 495-525, October.
    7. Lips, Wouter, 2019. "The BRICs and International Tax Governance: The Case of Automatic Exchange of Information," SocArXiv 9nmke, Center for Open Science.
    8. Pritish Behuria, 2019. "The comparative political economy of plastic bag bans in East Africa: why implementation has varied in Rwanda, Kenya and Uganda," Global Development Institute Working Paper Series 372019, GDI, The University of Manchester.

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