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Courts of Many Minds

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  • Spiekermann, Kai
  • Goodin, Robert E.

Abstract

In A Constitution of Many Minds Cass Sunstein argues that the three major approaches to constitutional interpretation – Traditionalism, Populism and Cosmopolitanism – all rely on some variation of a ‘many-minds’ argument. Here we assess each of these claims through the lens of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. In regard to the first two approaches we explore the implications of sequential influence among courts (past and foreign, respectively). In regard to the Populist approach, we consider the influence of opinion leaders.

Suggested Citation

  • Spiekermann, Kai & Goodin, Robert E., 2012. "Courts of Many Minds," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(03), pages 555-571, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:bjposi:v:42:y:2012:i:03:p:555-571_00
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Dietrich, Franz & Spiekermann, Kai, 2012. "Independent opinions? on the causal foundations of belief formation and jury theorems," MPRA Paper 40137, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2010.
    2. Dietrich, Franz & Spiekermann, Kai, 2013. "Epistemic Democracy With Defensible Premises," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, pages 87-120.
    3. George Masterton & Erik J. Olsson & Staffan Angere, 2016. "Linking as voting: how the Condorcet jury theorem in political science is relevant to webometrics," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 106(3), pages 945-966, March.

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