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Ideological Hedging in Uncertain Times: Inconsistent Legislative Representation and Voter Enfranchisement

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  • Yoshinaka, Antoine
  • Grose, Christian R.

Abstract

Can ideological inconsistency in legislators’ voting records be explained by uncertainty about constituent preferences? Do legislators ‘hedge their bets’ ideologically when faced with constituency uncertainty? This article presents an uncertainty-based theory of ideological hedging. Legislators faced with uncertainty about their constituent preferences have an incentive to present ideologically inconsistent roll-call records. Legislators experiment with a variety of roll-call positions in order to learn the preferences of their constituents. An examination of US senators during 1961–2004 shows that uncertainty due to black enfranchisement and mobilization led to higher ideological inconsistency in legislative voting records. Ideologically inconsistent behaviour by elected officials can be characterized as best responses to a changing and uncertain environment. These results have implications for representation and the stability of democracy.

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  • Yoshinaka, Antoine & Grose, Christian R., 2011. "Ideological Hedging in Uncertain Times: Inconsistent Legislative Representation and Voter Enfranchisement," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 41(4), pages 765-794, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:bjposi:v:41:y:2011:i:04:p:765-794_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Lee, 2014. "Third-party threat and the dimensionality of major-party roll call voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(3), pages 515-531, June.

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