IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/apsrev/v85y1991i02p457-474_17.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Constituency Opinion and Congressional Policy Making: The Reagan Defense Buildup

Author

Listed:
  • Bartels, Larry M.

Abstract

Rrepresentatives' votes on a series of defense budget roll calls in the first year of the Reagan administration's Pentagon buildup are related to constituency opinions on defense spending during the 1980 election campaign. The strong aggregate constituency demand for increased defense spending in 1980 is estimated to have added almost $17 billion (about 10%) to the total fiscal year 1982 Pentagon appropriation. The impact of constituency opinion was largely independent of specific political circumstances: differential responsiveness in districts with partisan turnover, intense districtlevel competition, and strong presidential coattails together accounted for less than $1 billion in additional appropriations, with the remaining $16 billion attributable to across-the-board responsiveness by even the most safely incumbent representatives.

Suggested Citation

  • Bartels, Larry M., 1991. "Constituency Opinion and Congressional Policy Making: The Reagan Defense Buildup," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 85(2), pages 457-474, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:85:y:1991:i:02:p:457-474_17
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0003055400178670/type/journal_article
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sean Gailmard & Jeffery A. Jenkins, 2009. "Agency Problems, the 17th Amendment, and Representation in the Senate," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(2), pages 324-342, April.
    2. Scott Crichlow, 2002. "Legislators' Personality Traits and Congressional Support for Free Trade," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 46(5), pages 693-711, October.
    3. Simon Hug, 2011. "Policy consequences of direct legislation theory, empirical models and evidence," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 559-578, April.
    4. Tangian, Andranik S., 2017. "Policy representation by the 2017 Bundestag," Working Paper Series in Economics 108, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
    5. Kriesi, Hanspeter, 2001. "Die Rolle der Öffentlichkeit im politischen Entscheidungsprozess: Ein konzeptueller Rahmen für ein international vergleichendes Forschungsprojekt," Discussion Papers, Working Group Political Communication and Mobilization P 01-701, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    6. Andranik Tangian, 2017. "Policy Representation of a Parliament: The Case of the German Bundestag 2013 Elections," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 151-179, January.
    7. Karolin Soontjens & Julie Sevenans, 2022. "Electoral incentives make politicians respond to voter preferences: Evidence from a survey experiment with members of Parliament in Belgium," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 103(5), pages 1125-1139, September.
    8. Roy Kwon, 2015. "Does Radical Partisan Politics Affect National Income Distributions? Congressional Polarization and Income Inequality in the United States, 1913–2008," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 96(1), pages 49-64, March.
    9. Gabriel S. Lenz, 2009. "Learning and Opinion Change, Not Priming: Reconsidering the Priming Hypothesis," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(4), pages 821-837, October.
    10. Jeffrey W. Knopf, 1998. "How Rational Is “The Rational Public†?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(5), pages 544-571, October.
    11. Jarron Bowman, 2020. "Do the Affluent Override Average Americans? Measuring Policy Disagreement and Unequal Influence," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 101(3), pages 1018-1037, May.
    12. Tangian, Andranik S., 2017. "Policy representation by German parties at the 2017 federal election," Working Paper Series in Economics 107, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
    13. Baum, Matt, 2000. "A Paradox of Public Opinion: Why a Less Interested Public is More Attentive to War," Institute for Social Science Research, Working Paper Series qt7200v97q, Institute for Social Science Research, UCLA.
    14. Tanguiane, Andranick S., 2019. "Combining the third vote with traditional elections," Working Paper Series in Economics 132, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
    15. Jacob M. Grumbach & Jamila Michener, 2022. "American Federalism, Political Inequality, and Democratic Erosion," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 699(1), pages 143-155, January.
    16. Cahan, Steven F., 1996. "Political use of income: Some experimental evidence from Capitol Hill," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 69-87.
    17. Andrew B. Whitford, 2007. "Competing Explanations for Bureaucratic Preferences," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 19(3), pages 219-247, July.
    18. Richard C. Eichenberg & Richard Stoll, 2003. "Representing Defense," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 47(4), pages 399-422, August.
    19. Guri Rosén, 2019. "Proving Their Worth? The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and the Members of the European Parliament," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 7(3), pages 266-278.
    20. Travis Sharp, 2019. "Wars, presidents, and punctuated equilibriums in US defense spending," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 52(3), pages 367-396, September.
    21. Bartels, Larry, 2005. "Economic Inequality and Political Representation," Papers 08-11-2005, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy.
    22. David H. Clark, 2001. "Trading Butter for Guns," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(5), pages 636-660, October.
    23. Sencer Ecer & Nicholas J. Veasey, 2015. "The Shifting Determinants of Defense Spending Preferences Between 1980 and 2008," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(1), pages 75-88, February.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:85:y:1991:i:02:p:457-474_17. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kirk Stebbing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/psr .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.