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Electoral Laws, Party Systems, and Elites: The Case of Spain

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  • Gunther, Richard

Abstract

Using aggregate, survey, and in-depth elite interview data from Spain in the 1970s and 1980s, I demonstrate that the “mechanical” effect of the Spanish electoral law is as strong as that of many single-member constituency systems. But the “distal” effect of the electoral law on the party system is shown to be complex and multifaceted, not direct and deterministic. The perceptions, calculations, strategies, and behavior of party elites play a crucial intervening role between the electoral law and the overall shape of the party system.

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  • Gunther, Richard, 1989. "Electoral Laws, Party Systems, and Elites: The Case of Spain," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(3), pages 835-858, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:83:y:1989:i:03:p:835-858_08
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    1. repec:gig:joupla:v:3:y:2011:i:2:p:3-41 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Torregrosa Hetland, Sara, 2017. "The political economy of peripheral tax reform : the Spanish fiscal transition," Lund Papers in Economic History 156, Lund University, Department of Economic History.
    3. Gschwend, Thomas, 2005. "Institutional Incentives for Strategic Voting:," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 05-03, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    4. Douglas W. Rae, 1995. "Using District Magnitude to Regulate Political Party Competition," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 65-75, Winter.
    5. Gschwend, Thomas, 2005. "Institutional incentives for strategic voting : the case of Portugal," Papers 05-03, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    6. Ignacio Lago & Marina Costa Lobo & Santiago Lago-Peñas, 2016. "Coattail effects and electoral coordination," Working Papers. Collection B: Regional and sectoral economics 1603, Universidade de Vigo, GEN - Governance and Economics research Network.

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