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Only-child matching penalty in the marriage market

Author

Listed:
  • Keisuke KAWATA

    (The University of Tokyo)

  • Mizuki KOMURA

    (Kwansei Gakuin University and IZA)

Abstract

This study explores the marriage matching of only-child individuals and the related outcomes. Specifically, we analyze two aspects: First, we investigate the marriage patterns of only children, examining whether people choose mates in a positive or negative assortative manner regarding only-child status. We find that, along with being more likely to remain single, only children are more likely to marry another only child. Second, we measure the matching premium or penalty as the difference in partners’ socioeconomic status between only-child and non-only-child individuals, where socioeconomic status is approximated by years of schooling. Our estimates indicate that among women who marry an only-child husband, only children are penalized, as their partners’ educational attainment is 0.63 years lower. Finally, we discuss the potential sources of this penalty in light of our empirical findings.

Suggested Citation

  • Keisuke KAWATA & Mizuki KOMURA, 2026. "Only-child matching penalty in the marriage market," JODE - Journal of Demographic Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(3), pages 376-410, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvde:v:92:y:2026:i:3:p:376-410
    DOI: 10.1017/dem.2025.10011
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    JEL classification:

    • J11 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Demographic Trends, Macroeconomic Effects, and Forecasts
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination

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