IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cje/issued/v32y1999i1p71-91.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Tariffs versus Quotas with Strategic Investment

Author

Listed:
  • Hideki Konishi

Abstract

The relative efficiency of tariffs versus quotas is analyzed in a Cournot oligopoly with strategic investment, introducing quota licence fees to neutralize the international distributional effect. When such licence fees remove quota rents from foreign firms, then, for the case of constrained entry with a sufficiently large number of firms, quotas frequently hold a welfare advantage, since tariffs relatively aggravate the inefficiency from overinvestment. In the case of free entry and exit, however, tariffs hold a welfare advantage, since there is greater benefit of increasing returns to scale to the economy by avoidance of excessive entry of firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Hideki Konishi, 1999. "Tariffs versus Quotas with Strategic Investment," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 32(1), pages 71-91, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:32:y:1999:i:1:p:71-91
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0008-4085%28199902%2932%3A1%3C71%3ATVQWSI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q
    Download Restriction: only available to JSTOR subscribers
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Hung-Yi & Chang, Yang-Ming & Chiou, Jiunn-Rong, 2011. "A welfare analysis of tariffs and equivalent quotas under demand uncertainty: Implications for tariffication," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 549-561, October.
    2. Jan Jørgensen & Philipp Schröder, 2007. "Effects of Tariffication: Tariffs and Quotas under Monopolistic Competition," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 479-498, September.
    3. Matsumura, Toshihiro & Okamura, Makoto, 2006. "Equilibrium number of firms and economic welfare in a spatial price discrimination model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 90(3), pages 396-401, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F1 - International Economics - - Trade
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:32:y:1999:i:1:p:71-91. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Prof. Werner Antweiler (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ceaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.