El sector no lucrativo desde el enfoque de la elección pública: Cuando la oferta no lucrativa de bienes públicos es el resultado de decisiones emanadas del proceso político

The voluntary supply of collective goods by nonprofit institutions has deserved little attention in the Public Choice literature, and the clasical nonprofits approach does not consider nonprofits supply as a collective decision, although individuals, either as consumers or as donors, are in the center of their theoretical constructs. In this paper we hypothesize that voluntary nonprofits' provision is a collective choice. We present a model in which the members of a community, both those who fund the nonprofits and those who do not (free riders) vote, so choosing between a political program of governmental supply and a political program of non governmental supply. Afterward, they must also decide whether a program of fiscal deductions to donations to nonprofits is applied or not. Our model shows that if there is a majority of cooperative contributors public provision is voted and a minimum percentage of cooperative contributors is required for voluntary provision.