Productivité et risque de destruction des emplois : Un argument favorable à l'instauration d'une taxe sur les licenciements
We consider a matching model where firms face a trade-off between the productivity and the expected duration of jobs. As firms ignore the effect of their decision on the unemployment costs, hence the payroll taxes they must pay, the productivity as well as the destruction rate are too high. Financing the unemployment costs by lay-off taxes lead the firms to internalize the budgetary consequences of their technological choice, lowering then unemployment and improving market efficiency.
Volume (Year): 117 (2007)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
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