Demande de travail et élasticité des heures au salaire
Abstract This article examine the theoretical meaning of the elasticity of hours to wages accounting for Labour demand in an on-the-job equilibrium search model framework. A firm posts part and full-time job offers as a result of the trade-off between its demand variability, its wage costs and its hiring costs. Utility as a function of wages and the number of weekly worked hours is the criterion workers consider when accepting or rejecting job offers. We prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium, in which all firms hire both part- and full-time workers. Simulating the model, we show that the relationship between hours and wages depends dramatically on the firm’s demand shape parameter and not on the individual preference for leisure. JEL Classification – J22, J23, J64.
Volume (Year): 75 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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