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Responsabilité politique et design contractuel des Partenariats Public Privé

Author

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  • Laure Athias

Abstract

This paper studies political accountability under various contractual forms of Public Private Partnerships. A critical aspect of any ppp contract is the allocation of demand risk between the public authority and the private provider. We show that contracts in which the private provider bears demand risk motivate more the public authority from responding to customer needs. The policy implication is that the current trend towards a greater resort to contracts in which private providers do not bear demand risk may not be optimal in terms of allocative efficiency. Classification JEL : D23, H1, L5, 017.

Suggested Citation

  • Laure Athias, 2009. "Responsabilité politique et design contractuel des Partenariats Public Privé," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 60(4), pages 1011-1021.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_604_1011
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Athias, Laure & Saussier, Stéphane, 2018. "Are public private partnerships that rigid? And why? Evidence from price provisions in French toll road concession contracts," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 174-186.
    2. Laure ATHIAS & Raphael SOUBEYRAN, 2012. "Less Risk, More Effort: Demand Risk Allocation in Incomplete Contracts," Working Papers 12-20, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Jun 2012.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy

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