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Un partenariat public-privé rigide ou flexible ?. Théorie et application aux concessions routières à péage

Author

Listed:
  • Laure Athias
  • Stéphane Saussier

Abstract

In this article, we explore the contractual design of toll road concession contracts. We highlight the fact that contracting parties try to sign not only complete rigid contracts in order to avoid renegotiations but also flexible contracts in order to adapt contractual framework to contingencies and to create incentives for cooperative behavior. This gives rise to multiple toll adjustment provisions and to a tradeoff between rigid and flexible contracts. Such a tradeoff is formalized using an incomplete contract framework ?including ex post maladaptation and renegotiation costs? and propositions are tested using an original database of 71 concession contracts. Our results suggest an important role for economic efficiency concerns, as well as politics, in designing such public-private contracts. Codes JEL : D23, H11, H54, L14, L9.

Suggested Citation

  • Laure Athias & Stéphane Saussier, 2007. "Un partenariat public-privé rigide ou flexible ?. Théorie et application aux concessions routières à péage," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 58(3), pages 565-576.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_583_0565
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Athias, Laure & Saussier, Stéphane, 2007. "Contractual flexibility or rigidity for public private partnerships? Theory and evidence from infrastructure concession contracts," MPRA Paper 10541, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Meunier, David & Quinet, Emile, 2010. "Tips and Pitfalls in PPP design," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 126-138.
    3. Athias, Laure, 2007. "Political accountability, incentives, and Contractual design of public private partnerships," MPRA Paper 10538, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. repec:ces:ifodic:v:12:y:2014:i:3:p:19126463 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Laure ATHIAS & Raphael SOUBEYRAN, 2012. "Less Risk, More Effort: Demand Risk Allocation in Incomplete Contracts," Working Papers 12-20, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Jun 2012.
    6. Antonio Estache & Stéphane Saussier, 2014. "Public-Private Partnerships and Efficiency: A Short Assessment," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 12(03), pages 08-13, October.
    7. Athias, Laure & Nunez, Antonio, 2008. "The more the merrier? Number of bidders, information dispersion, renegotiation and winner’s curse in toll road concessions," MPRA Paper 10539, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Antonio Estache & Stéphane Saussier, 2014. "Public-Private Partnerships and Efficiency: A Short Assessment," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 12(3), pages 08-13, October.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L9 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities

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