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Le rendement des dépenses électorales en France. Le cas des élections législatives de 1997

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  • Martial Foucault
  • Abel François

Abstract

This article aims at evaluating the influence of campaign spending on legislative vote share within a new French campaign finance law. From an empirical analysis derived from the 1997 French legislative election, we show that the electoral outcomes are sensitive to campaign spending. Using ols and 2SLS methods and taking into account the bias of endogeneity, we demonstrate that the spending of incumbent candidates have a direct and positive effect whereas the spending of their challengers have an indirect and negative effect. In the context of the implementation of a new campaign finance regulation (characterized by both spending ceiling and public repayment), this result means that financial barriers to entry into political market are not entirely reduced. In conclusion, the return of French campaign spending is not quite different from those empirically verified within the American electoral process. Classification JEL?: D72

Suggested Citation

  • Martial Foucault & Abel François, 2005. "Le rendement des dépenses électorales en France. Le cas des élections législatives de 1997," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 56(5), pages 1125-1143.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_565_1125
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Morris Coats, R. & Dalton, Thomas R., 1992. "Entry barriers in politics and uncontested elections," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 75-90, October.
    2. Fleck, Robert K & Kilby, Christopher, 2002. "Reassessing the Role of Constituency in Congressional Voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 112(1-2), pages 31-53, July.
    3. Banaian, King & Luksetich, William A, 1991. "Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 29(1), pages 92-100, January.
    4. W. Crain & Robert Tollison & Donald Leavens, 1988. "Laissez-faire in campaign finance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 201-212, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yasmine Bekkouche & Julia Cage, 2018. "The Price of a Vote: Evidence from France, 1993-2014," Working Papers Series 68, Institute for New Economic Thinking.
    2. Yasmine Bekkouche & Julia Cage, 2019. "The Heterogeneous Price of a Vote: Evidence from France, 1993-2014," Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers 2019-09, Sciences Po Departement of Economics.
    3. Christine Fauvelle-Aymar & Abel François, 2003. "Campagne électorale, préférences politiques et participation. Une étude empirique sur les élections législatives françaises de 1997," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques j04009, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
    4. Farvaque, Etienne & Foucault, Martial & Vigeant, Stéphane, 2020. "The politician and the vote factory: Candidates’ resource management skills and electoral returns," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 38-55.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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