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Social Desirability of Earnings Tests

Author

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  • Cremer Helmuth

    (Toulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ, IDEI and Institut universitaire de France), 21 Allée de Brienne,Toulouse, France)

  • Pestieau Pierre

    (CREPP, Université de Liège, Place du 20 Août 7,Liège, Belgium)

  • Lozachmeur Jean-Marie

    (Toulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ and IDEI),Toulouse, France)

Abstract

In many countries, pension systems involve some form of earnings test; i.e. an individual’s benefits are reduced if he has labor income. This paper examines whether or not such earnings tests emerge when pension system and income tax are optimally designed. We use a simple model with individuals differing both in productivity and in their health status. The working life of an individual has two ‘endings’: an official retirement age at which he starts drawing pension benefits (while possibly supplementing them with some labor income) and an effective age of retirement at which professional activity is completely given up. Weekly work time is endogenous, but constant in the period before official retirement and again constant (but possibly at a different level), after official retirement. Earnings tests mean that earnings are subject to a higher tax after official retirement than before.We show under which conditions earnings tests emerge both under a linear and under a non-linear tax scheme. In particular, we show that earnings tests will occur if heterogeneities in health or productivity are more significant after official retirement than before.

Suggested Citation

  • Cremer Helmuth & Pestieau Pierre & Lozachmeur Jean-Marie, 2008. "Social Desirability of Earnings Tests," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 9(2), pages 114-134, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:germec:v:9:y:2008:i:2:p:114-134
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0475.2008.00427.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Wheadon, Daniel & Castex, Gonzalo & Kudrna, George & Woodland, Alan, 2024. "Non-linear means-tested pensions: Welfare and distributional analyses," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    2. Daniel Vuuren, 2014. "Flexible Retirement," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 573-593, July.
    3. Woodland, A., 2016. "Taxation, Pensions, and Demographic Change," Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, in: Piggott, John & Woodland, Alan (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 713-780, Elsevier.
    4. Fehr, Hans & Uhde, Johannes, 2012. "Optimal Pension Design in General Equlibrium," VfS Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 62024, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    5. Fehr, Hans & Uhde, Johannes, 2014. "Means-testing and economic efficiency in pension design," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 44(S1), pages 57-67.
    6. Hans Fehr & Johannes Uhde, 2013. "On the optimal design of pension systems," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 40(3), pages 457-482, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
    • J26 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Retirement; Retirement Policies

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