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Political Parties, Candidate Selection, and Quality of Government

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  • Aragón Fernando M.

    () (Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, BC V5A1S6, Canada)

Abstract

This article explores empirically the relation between political parties’ institutions and quality of government. I focus on procedures used to nominate presidential candidates given the importance of candidate selection in party politics. Using a panel dataset of Latin American countries, I find robust evidence of a positive relation between the use of democratic procedures, such as primaries, and quality of government. To shed light on the mechanism, I examine why parties use primaries. I find evidence suggestive that the results are mostly driven by the increase in political competition and candidates’ pre-electoral incentives.

Suggested Citation

  • Aragón Fernando M., 2013. "Political Parties, Candidate Selection, and Quality of Government," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 13(2), pages 783-810, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:13:y:2013:i:2:p:783-810:n:20
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Masayuki Kudamatsu, 2012. "Has Democratization Reduced Infant Mortality In Sub-Saharan Africa? Evidence From Micro Data," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 10(6), pages 1294-1317, December.
    2. Nicolas Sahuguet, 2010. "Party Organization and Electoral Competition," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 26(2), pages 212-242.
    3. Klumpp, Tilman & Polborn, Mattias K., 2006. "Primaries and the New Hampshire Effect," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 1073-1114, August.
    4. Jackson, Matthew O. & Mathevet, Laurent & Mattes, Kyle, 2007. "Nomination Processes and Policy Outcomes," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 2(1), pages 67-92, March.
    5. Bernard Caillaud & Jean Tirole, 2002. "Parties as Political Intermediaries," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(4), pages 1453-1489.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H80 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - General

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