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Testing the Median Voter Model and Moving Beyond its Limits: Do Personal Characteristics Explain Legislative Shirking?

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  • Marco Portmann
  • David Stadelmann

Abstract

Objectives This study quantifies the quality of the median voter model (MVM) and analyzes whether personal characteristics explain legislative shirking. Methods We employ a natural measure for divergence between politicians and voter preferences by matching final roll†call votes of politicians with referendum results. The relevance of personal characteristics for legislative shirking is analyzed by means of logit regressions. Results The MVM outperforms a random decision benchmark when predicting the behavior of politicians regarding the revealed preferences of their constituencies, but the model fails to account for a substantial part of its theoretical prediction. Personal characteristics of politicians do not explain overall legislative shirking. Conclusions Policy predictions based on the MVM should be carefully considered because of failing convergence. Majority elections tend to crowd out personal characteristics of politicians as potential explanations for legislative shirking.

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  • Marco Portmann & David Stadelmann, 2017. "Testing the Median Voter Model and Moving Beyond its Limits: Do Personal Characteristics Explain Legislative Shirking?," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 98(5), pages 1264-1276, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:socsci:v:98:y:2017:i:5:p:1264-1276
    DOI: 10.1111/ssqu.12379
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    Cited by:

    1. Portmann, Marco & Stadelmann, David & Eichenberger, Reiner, 2022. "Incentives dominate selection – Chamber-changing legislators are driven by electoral rules and voter preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 193(C), pages 353-366.
    2. Thomas Tobias & Heß Moritz & Wagner Gert G., 2017. "Reluctant to Reform? A Note on Risk-Loving Politicians and Bureaucrats," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 68(3), pages 167-179, December.
    3. Roberto Brunetti & Matthieu Pourieux, 2023. "Representative Policy-Makers? A Behavioral Experiment with French Politicians," Working Papers 2319, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    4. Stadelmann, David & Torrens, Gustavo, 2020. "Who is the ultimate boss of legislators: Voters, special interest groups or parties?," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224562, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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