Politics, Pragmatism, and Departures from the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1954-2004
This article uses Cox proportional hazards models to explain departures from the U.S. Courts of Appeals from 1954-2004. I argue that reforms to pension eligibility and financial incentives in 1984 extended opportunities for voluntary departures and strategic behavior, and that reasons for quitting (whether political, personal, or institutional) differed among types of departures and over time. Copyright (c) 2009 by the Southwestern Social Science Association.
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Volume (Year): 90 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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