A Note on Friedman and the Neo-Bayesian Approach
The literature dealing with Milton Friedman's methodological framework tends to overlook his adhere nce to the neo-Bayesian interpretation of probability theory. In this note, it is shown that Friedman's probabilistic framework has deep i mplications for his notion of rationality and treatment of expectatio ns, and that disregarding this feature of his analytical toolkit lead s to arguments which are factually wrong and misleading. R. E. Lucas' s and Friedman's methodological approaches are then contrasted in ter ms of their probabilistic underpinnings. Copyright 1987 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester
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Volume (Year): 55 (1987)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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