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The Liquidity Demand for Corporate Property Insurance

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  • Arthur Hau

Abstract

This article suggests that liquidity may be an important reason for a corporation to purchase property insurance. A model of a risk‐neutral producer facing an endogenously determined risk of property damage under an output contract that penalizes underproduction is formulated to exemplify such a real need of liquidity. Under the output contract, the producer may purchase full unfavorable property insurance even when postloss financing is available. Surprisingly, the conclusion may still hold when the cost of postloss financing equals that of long‐term capital, provided that the rate of underproduction penalty is sufficiently high. Similar conclusions apply when postloss financing is replaced by planned internal reserve (self‐insurance) that may be invested in the short run at an interest rate that is lower than the long‐term cost of capital. When the capital market is perfect, however, the holding of planned internal reserve eliminates the purchase of actuarially unfavorable property insurance.

Suggested Citation

  • Arthur Hau, 2006. "The Liquidity Demand for Corporate Property Insurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 73(2), pages 261-278, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:73:y:2006:i:2:p:261-278
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6975.2006.00173.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Adachi, Daisuke & Nakata, Hiroyuki & Sawada, Yasuyuki & Sekiguchi, Kunio, 2023. "Adverse selection and moral hazard in corporate insurance markets: Evidence from the 2011 Thailand floods," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 205(C), pages 376-386.
    2. Jiang, Wei & Adams, Mike & Jia-Upreti, Joy, 2012. "Does managerial entrenchment motivate the insurance decision?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 117-128.
    3. Erwann Michel-Kerjan & Paul A. Raschky & Howard C. Kunreuther, 2009. "Corporate Demand for Insurance: An Empirical Analysis of the U.S. Market for Catastrophe and Non-Catastrophe Risks," Working Papers hal-00372420, HAL.
    4. Carole Bernard & Weidong Tian, 2009. "Optimal Reinsurance Arrangements Under Tail Risk Measures," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 76(3), pages 709-725, September.
    5. Emilio Venezian, 2009. "Incentive incompatibilities and arbitrage opportunities," Journal of Risk Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 10(5), pages 422-431, November.
    6. Joy Jia & Mike Adams & Mike Buckle, 2012. "Insurance and ownership structure in India’s corporate sector," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 129-149, March.

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