Flexible Spending Accounts as Insurance
We model flexible spending accounts (FSAs) as a special type of insurance policy. We prove the following results given losses drawn from a continuous distribution: (1) the optimal election amount, "F"-super-*, is increasing in the consumer's level of risk aversion; (2) "F"-super-* is increasing in the level of the maximum loss; If utility is decreasing in absolute risk aversion (DARA), then "F"-super-* is (3) decreasing in income and (4) increasing in the marginal tax rate. Copyright 2003 The Journal of Risk and Insurance.
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Volume (Year): 70 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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