IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jpbect/v22y2020i2p408-432.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The impact of peer ratings on cooperation: The role of information and cost of rating

Author

Listed:
  • Marco Faillo
  • Daniela Grieco
  • Luca Zarri

Abstract

In this study, we experimentally analyze the effectiveness of payoff‐irrelevant peer‐to‐peer ratings as a cooperation enforcement device in a finitely repeated public goods game setting. We run two treatments that differ in the amount of information on own and others' received rating points provided to the players, whereas, in a third treatment, we analyze peer approval when assigning ratings to others is costly. In particular, we wonder whether, even under anonymity and in the absence of reputational concerns, (a) players rate others' contribution decisions in the expected direction and (b) the peer rating mechanisms under study foster cooperation and welfare. Our findings reveal that, in the two costless rating treatments, peer rating concerns lead to higher contributions and efficiency, compared to our control. Introducing a small fixed cost for assigning rating points results in a very high percentage of subjects deciding not to rate others' behavior, so that cooperation cannot be enforced.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Faillo & Daniela Grieco & Luca Zarri, 2020. "The impact of peer ratings on cooperation: The role of information and cost of rating," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(2), pages 408-432, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:22:y:2020:i:2:p:408-432
    DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12384
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12384
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/jpet.12384?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:22:y:2020:i:2:p:408-432. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/apettea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.