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International Outsourcing, Tax, and Patent Protection

Author

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  • SOUMYANANDA DINDA
  • ARIJIT MUKHERJEE

Abstract

We show that, in the case of a vertical technology transfer, if there is imperfect knowledge spillover under a weak patent protection, the strong patent protection in the developing country increases the profit of the developed-country firm if there is a uniform tax rate in the developing country. If there is either perfect knowledge spillover under weak patent protection or the developing country charges discriminatory tax rates, the profits of the developed-country firms are the same under weak and strong patent protections in the developing countries.
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Suggested Citation

  • Soumyananda Dinda & Arijit Mukherjee, 2011. "International Outsourcing, Tax, and Patent Protection," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(1), pages 139-154, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:13:y:2011:i:1:p:139-154
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    Cited by:

    1. Mukherjee, Arijit & Sinha, Uday Bhanu, 2014. "Can cost asymmetry be a rationale for privatisation?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 497-503.
    2. Mukherjee, Arijit & Neogi, Chiranjib, 2014. "Vertical technology transfer and the welfare implications of patent protection," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 239-247.
    3. Mukherjee, Arijit & Tsai, Yingyi, 2013. "Multi-sourcing as an entry deterrence strategy," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 108-112.
    4. Marjit, Sugata & Xu, Xinpeng & Yang, Lei, 2009. "Offshore Outsourcing, Contractual R&D and Intellectual Property in Developing Countries," MPRA Paper 19362, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Tai‐Liang Chen & Zuyi Huang, 2020. "Technology licensing or cost‐reducing outsourcing? Game theoretical analysis on consumers' home bias effects and firms' optimal strategies," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 72(4), pages 417-433, October.
    6. repec:tsa:wpaper:0003eco is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Iida, Takeshi & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2025. "Environmental taxes, offshoring and welfare: The effects of environmental damage and pollution intensity," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).

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