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The Going-Concern Market Anomaly




ABSTRACT We explore the market response to announcements of first-time going-concern (GC) audit opinions and, for a subset of these cases, their subsequent withdrawal, from 1993 to 2005. We find that the market fully responds to GC withdrawal announcements but underreacts to the GC announcements themselves, resulting in a downward drift of - 14% over the one-year period subsequent to the GC opinion. This result is robust to alternative explanations documented in prior literature. However, after adjusting for transactions costs, the opportunity to earn profits by trading on this market anomaly is limited. We demonstrate that despite such clear adverse signals about the firm's continuing financial viability, this information is not being fully impounded by the market on a timely basis. Our findings differ from those of others who suggest that there is no pricing anomaly associated with GC opinions in the United States. We show that this is likely due to important issues with their research methods. Copyright (c), University of Chicago on behalf of the Institute of Professional Accounting, 2008.

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  • Asad Kausar & Richard J. Taffler & Christine Tan, 2009. "The Going-Concern Market Anomaly," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 213-239, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:joares:v:47:y:2009:i:1:p:213-239

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Beatriz García Osma & Belén Gill de Albornoz Noguer & Elena De las Heras Cristobal, 2016. "Opinion shopping: Partner versus firm-level evidence," Working Papers. Serie EC 2016-02, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    2. repec:bla:acctfi:v:57:y:2017:i:2:p:565-595 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Marilena Mironiuc & Ioan-Bogdan Robu & Mihaela-Alina Robu, 2011. """Going Concern"" And The Effects Of The Operational Cycle Management. An Empirical Study Concerning The Usage Of Financial Analysis For Obtaining Preliminary Proofs In The Task Of," Analele Stiintifice ale Universitatii "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" din Iasi - Stiinte Economice, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, vol. 2011, pages 41-53, july.
    4. Ruben M.T. Peixinho & Richard J. Taffler, 2011. "Are analysts misleading investors? The case of goingconcern opinions," CEFAGE-UE Working Papers 2011_22, University of Evora, CEFAGE-UE (Portugal).
    5. Luís M. S. Coelho & Rúben M. T. Peixinho & Siri Terjensen, 2012. "Going concern opinions are not bad news: Evidence from industry rivals," Working Papers Department of Economics 2012/16, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Universidade de Lisboa.
    6. DeFond, Mark & Zhang, Jieying, 2014. "A review of archival auditing research," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 275-326.

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