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Market Structure, Changing Incentives, And Underwriter Certification


  • Steven D. Dolvin


Early studies find that higher quality underwriters are associated with lower underpricing; however, more recent evidence suggests the opposite relation. By controlling for influences associated with the changing market structure of the underwriter industry, I provide a potential explanation for this conflict, that is, that higher quality underwriters do certify initial public offerings, resulting in lower underpricing. However, effects associated with increasing market shares tend to offset certification benefits, particularly for issues underwritten by the largest investment banks. 2005 The Southern Finance Association and the Southwestern Finance Association.

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  • Steven D. Dolvin, 2005. "Market Structure, Changing Incentives, And Underwriter Certification," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 28(3), pages 403-419.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jfnres:v:28:y:2005:i:3:p:403-419

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Philip E. Strahan, 1999. "Borrower risk and the price and nonprice terms of bank loans," Staff Reports 90, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    2. Jim Armstrong, 2003. "The Syndicated Loan Market: Developments in the North American Context," Staff Working Papers 03-15, Bank of Canada.
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