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Do Tracking Stocks Reduce Information Asymmetries? An Analysis Of Liquidity And Adverse Selection


  • John Elder
  • Pankaj K. Jain
  • Jang-Chul Kim


A firm's announcement that it intends to restructure based on tracking stock is usually associated with a positive stock price reaction, at least in the short run. Typically, this reaction is attributed to expected reductions in a diversification discount, through reduced agency costs or information asymmetries. We reinvestigate this latter hypothesis by focusing on the liquidity provided by market makers before and after a firm issues a tracking stock. Our results suggest that such restructurings are not effective at reducing information asymmetries. Rather, firms that issue tracking stocks exhibit less liquidity and greater adverse selection than comparable control firms. 2005 The Southern Finance Association and the Southwestern Finance Association.

Suggested Citation

  • John Elder & Pankaj K. Jain & Jang-Chul Kim, 2005. "Do Tracking Stocks Reduce Information Asymmetries? An Analysis Of Liquidity And Adverse Selection," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 28(2), pages 197-213.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jfnres:v:28:y:2005:i:2:p:197-213

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Goldreich, David, 2003. "Underpricing in Discriminatory and Uniform-Price Treasury Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 4105, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Jegadeesh, Narasimhan, 1993. " Treasury Auction Bids and the Salomon Squeeze," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(4), pages 1403-1419, September.
    3. Cammack, Elizabeth B, 1991. "Evidence on Bidding Strategies and the Information in Treasury Bill Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(1), pages 100-130, February.
    4. Nyborg, Kjell G. & Sundaresan, Suresh, 1996. "Discriminatory versus uniform Treasury auctions: Evidence from when-issued transactions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 63-104, September.
    5. Spindt, Paul A. & Stolz, Richard W., 1992. "Are US treasury bills underpriced in the primary market?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 891-908, September.
    6. Michael J. Fleming & Kenneth D. Garbade, 2002. "When the back office moved to the front burner: settlement fails in the treasury market after 9/11," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Nov, pages 35-57.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wei He & Tarun Mukherjee & Peihwang Wei, 2009. "Agency problems in tracking stock and minority carve-out decisions: Explaining the discrepancy in short- and long-term performances," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 33(1), pages 27-42, January.
    2. Rudy De Winne & Christophe Majois, 2003. "A comparison of alternative spread d├ęcomposition models on Euronext Brussels," Brussels Economic Review, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, vol. 46(4), pages 91-136.

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