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Financial Globalization and the Governance of Domestic Financial Intermediaries

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  • Thierry Tressel
  • Thierry Verdier

Abstract

We model an economy in which domestic banks and firms face incentive constraints, as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). Firms borrow from banks and uninformed investors, and can collude with banks to reduce the intensity of monitoring. We study the general equilibrium effects of capital flows (portfolio investments and loans, FDI) on the governance of domestic banks. We find that liberalization of capital flows may deteriorate the governance of the domestic financial system by increasing firms' incentives to collude with banks, with negative effects on productivity. We also show that systemic bailout guarantees increase the risks of collusion.
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Suggested Citation

  • Thierry Tressel & Thierry Verdier, 2011. "Financial Globalization and the Governance of Domestic Financial Intermediaries," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 130-175, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jeurec:v:9:y:2011:i:1:p:130-175
    DOI: j.1365-2966.2010.01003.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Kunieda, Takuma & Okada, Keisuke & Shibata, Akihisa, 2014. "Finance And Inequality: How Does Globalization Change Their Relationship?," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(5), pages 1091-1128, July.
    2. Mr. Thierry Tressel & Mr. Thierry Verdier, 2014. "Optimal Prudential Regulation of Banks and the Political Economy of Supervision," IMF Working Papers 2014/090, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Kukenova, Madina, 2011. "Financial liberalization and allocative dfficiency of capital," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5670, The World Bank.
    4. Takuma Kunieda & Keisuke Okada & Akihisa Shibata, 2016. "Corruption, Financial Development and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence From an Instrumental Variable Approach With Human Genetic Diversity," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 45(3), pages 353-392, November.
    5. Clements Adeyinka Akinsoyinu, 2015. "The Impact of Capital Regulation on Bank Capital and Risk Decision. Evidence for European Global Systemically Important Banks," International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, Human Resource Management Academic Research Society, International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, vol. 5(3), pages 167-177, July.
    6. Blouin, Arthur & Ghosal, Sayantan & Mukand, Sharun W., 2025. "Globalization of capital flows and the (in)disciplining of nations," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 209-226.
    7. Raghuram Rajan, 2008. "Global Imbalances or why are the Poor Financing the Rich?," De Economist, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 3-24, March.
    8. Edgar Demetrio Tovar, 2011. "Globalización financiera y sus efectos sobre el desarrollo financiero," Revista ESPE - Ensayos sobre Política Económica, Banco de la Republica de Colombia, vol. 29(66), pages 80-127, December.
    9. Dam, Kaniṣka & Roy Chowdhury, Prabal, 2021. "Monitoring and incentives under multiple-bank lending: The role of collusive threats," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).

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