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Accountable and Under Control? Explaining Governments' Selection of Management Board Representatives

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  • Michael Buess

Abstract

The role of national representatives on the management boards (MBs) of European Union agencies (EUAs) is crucial in two respects. From a democratic point of view, national MB representatives' accountability may constitute a possible additional source of legitimacy for these technocratic bodies. From the perspective of European integration, their relationship with national institutions tells us about the status of EUAs and the extent to which their MBs constitute an intergovernmental control tool in the hands of the Member States. Contrary to their formal design, the collected data suggest that MBs have a rather supranational, technocratic character. With regard to their contribution to EUAs' democratic accountability, although the general level of accountability is high, the findings are more diverse. However, rather than reflecting control intentions by the Member States, different levels of accountability can best be explained by functional and institutional rather than strategic factors.

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  • Michael Buess, 2015. "Accountable and Under Control? Explaining Governments' Selection of Management Board Representatives," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 493-508, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:53:y:2015:i:3:p:493-508
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/jcms.12200
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    1. Benjamin Leidorf‐Tidå & Thijs de Boer, 2023. "Account‐Holding Intensity in the EU Accountability Landscape: A Comprehensive Review of EU agencies' Institutional Accountability Relationships," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(1), pages 215-235, January.

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