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Payout policy, financial flexibility, and agency costs of free cash flow

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  • Jacob Oded

Abstract

This paper explains how firms choose between dividends and open‐market repurchase programs, the prevailing method that firms use to disburse cash today. While earlier theories about payout policy are motivated by signaling, the motivation for payout in this paper is to prevent the waste of free cash by self‐interested insiders. In the model, dividends prevent free cash waste by forcing cash out, but result in underinvestment if the cash paid out is later needed for operations. Open‐market programs stimulate payout by providing personal gains to informed insiders that are associated with the firm's repurchase trade. Yet, they also avoid the underinvestment problem by leaving insiders the option to cancel the payout. Because their execution is optional, however, open‐market programs only partially prevent the waste of free cash. The model provides testable predictions that are generally consistent with the empirical evidence.

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  • Jacob Oded, 2020. "Payout policy, financial flexibility, and agency costs of free cash flow," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1-2), pages 218-252, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jbfnac:v:47:y:2020:i:1-2:p:218-252
    DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12407
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    Cited by:

    1. Hui Liang James & Hongxia Wang, 2021. "Independent director tenure and dividends," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(5-6), pages 1057-1091, May.
    2. Nan‐Ting Kuo & Shu Li & Shiyun Zhai, 2022. "Institutional features and audit pricing of excess cash holdings: Do auditor liabilities beyond financial statement assurance matter?," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(9-10), pages 1581-1604, October.
    3. Ed-Dafali, Slimane & Patel, Ritesh & Iqbal, Najaf, 2023. "A bibliometric review of dividend policy literature," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    4. Ni‐Yun Chen & Chi‐Chun Liu, 2021. "Share repurchases and market signaling: Evidence from earnings management," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 21(4), pages 1203-1224, December.

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