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CEO inside debt and convertible bonds

Author

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  • Wei†Hsien Li
  • S. Ghon Rhee
  • Carl Hsin†han Shen

Abstract

The question whether convertible bonds are issued to combat the risk†shifting problem is a subject of debate in the literature, primarily because of the unavailability of clear measures regarding managerial risk†shifting incentives. Taking advantage of recently developed inside debt†holding measures for CEOs, we find strong evidence in support of the risk†shifting hypothesis. When a CEO holds a large amount of inside debt, three distinct patterns emerge: (i) the firm exhibits a lower ratio of outstanding convertibles to total debt; (ii) the firm is less likely to issue convertibles than straight debt; and (iii) the firm devises contract terms to decrease the chance of conversion when it issues convertibles.

Suggested Citation

  • Wei†Hsien Li & S. Ghon Rhee & Carl Hsin†han Shen, 2018. "CEO inside debt and convertible bonds," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1-2), pages 232-249, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jbfnac:v:45:y:2018:i:1-2:p:232-249
    DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12285
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    Cited by:

    1. Liao, Yulu & Huang, Paoyu & Ni, Yensen, 2022. "Convertible bond issuance volume, capital structure, and firm value," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    2. Hao Li & Jinsha Zhao, 2020. "Inside debt and firm risk‐taking: Evidence from the UK pension reform," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(9-10), pages 1316-1364, October.
    3. Tianyi Ma & Minghui Jiang & Xuchuan Yuan, 2019. "Pay Me Later is Not Always Positively Associated with Bank Risk Reduction—From the Perspective of Long-Term Compensation and Black Box Effect," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-26, December.
    4. Mostafa Monzur Hasan & Ashrafee T. Hossain & Takdir Hossain, 2022. "CEO inside debt holdings and trade credit," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(3), pages 3677-3709, September.
    5. Zhang, Zhuang & Chizema, Amon & Kuo, Jing-Ming & Zhang, Qingjing, 2022. "Managerial risk-reducing incentives and social and exchange capital," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(6).
    6. Akdoğu, Evrim & Alp Paukowits, Aysun & Celikyurt, Ugur, 2020. "The relationship of G-Index and convertible debt issuance in the presence of restrictive covenants," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 373-390.
    7. Lee, Chien-Chiang & Wang, Chih-Wei & Wu, Yu-Ching, 2023. "CEO inside debt and downside risk: Evidence from internal and external environments," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    8. Hasan, Mostafa Monzur & Hossain, Ashrafee & Hossain, Takdir, 2023. "CEO inside debt holdings and credit ratings," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1).
    9. Shen, Carl Hsin-han & Zhang, Hao, 2020. "What's good for you is good for me: The effect of CEO inside debt on the cost of equity," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).

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