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Tender Offers and Target Management Responses: Managerial Entrenchment versus Stockholder Interest Revisited

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  • Thosar, Satish

Abstract

Defensive actions by managements facing hostile tender offers have generally been interpreted as entrenchment-oriented behavior. In this paper, longitudinal wealth effects on target firm stockholders are examined for the 1978-1985 period. The sample of firms where target management resists the tender offer registers significantly higher post-tender offer announcement gains as compared to the sample of firms where target management remains passive. The evidence appears to support the stockholder interest hypothesis. Copyright 1996 by MIT Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Thosar, Satish, 1996. "Tender Offers and Target Management Responses: Managerial Entrenchment versus Stockholder Interest Revisited," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 31(1), pages 87-104, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:finrev:v:31:y:1996:i:1:p:87-104
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    Cited by:

    1. Pearce II, John A. & Robinson, Richard Jr., 2004. "Hostile takeover defenses that maximize shareholder wealth," Business Horizons, Elsevier, vol. 47(5), pages 15-24.

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