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Why A Free Trade Area? The Tariff Also Rises

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  • MARTIN RICHARDSON

Abstract

This paper considers the choice between a customs union (wherein partners share a common external tariff) and a free trade area (wherein each partner chooses its own tariff against non‐members). Following the result that a customs union dominates a free trade area, with coordination of domestic tax policies, we show that a free trade area may nevertheless be chosen if tariffs are determined endogenously through industry lobbying. This is so even when the free trade area equates producer prices within its borders and induces tariff revenue competition and whether or not there is domestic free‐riding in lobbying.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Richardson, 1994. "Why A Free Trade Area? The Tariff Also Rises," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 79-96, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:6:y:1994:i:1:p:79-96
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.1994.tb00085.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Estevadeordal, Antoni & Shearer, Matthew & Suominen, Kati, 2009. "Market Access Provisions in Regional Trade Agreement," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 2524, Inter-American Development Bank.
    2. Appelbaum, Elie & Melatos, Mark, 2012. "Camouflaged Trade Agreements," Working Papers 2012-11, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
    3. Giovanni Facchini & Peri Silva & Gerald Willmann, 2021. "The Political Economy of Preferential Trade Agreements: An Empirical Investigation [Distributive politics and economic growth]," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(640), pages 3207-3240.
    4. Panagariya, A., 1997. "Preferential trading and the myth of natural trading partners," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 471-489, December.
    5. Facchini, Giovanni & Silva, Peri & Willmann, Gerald, 2013. "The customs union issue: Why do we observe so few of them?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 136-147.
    6. Martin Richardson, 2017. "Tariff Revenue Competition in a Free Trade Area," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Dimensions of Trade Policy, chapter 8, pages 171-181, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    7. Rafael Lima & Humberto Moreira & Thierry Verdier, 2008. "Lobbying and Information Transmission in Customs Unions," Working Papers 09_01, Universidade de São Paulo, Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade de Ribeirão Preto.
    8. P. Magee, Stephen & Lee, Hak-Loh, 2001. "Endogenous tariff creation and tariff diversion in a customs union," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 495-518, March.
    9. Schiff, Maurice, 2001. "Will the Real “Natural Trading Partner” Please Stand Up?," Journal of Economic Integration, Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University, vol. 16, pages 245-261.
    10. Shearer, Matthew & Suominen, Kati & Estevadeordal, Antoni, 2009. "Multilateralising RTAs in the Americas: State of Play and Ways Forward," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 2522, Inter-American Development Bank.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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