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An Empirical Test Of Competing Explanations For The Midterm Gap In The U.S. House




Previous empirical analyses of the midterm gap have been unreliable for two reasons: the limited degrees of freedom inherent in national-level time series data, and the failure to adequately control for competing explanations. By using district-level panel data, this paper is able to circumvent those weaknesses. Both withdrawn coattails and systematic presidential punishment at the midterm play an important role in explaining the observed midterm gap. Economic factors have a somewhat smaller impact. Evidence of systematic punishment of incumbent presidents in on-year elections is also observed. Copyright 1994 Blackwell Publishers Ltd..

Suggested Citation

  • Steven D. Levitt, 1994. "An Empirical Test Of Competing Explanations For The Midterm Gap In The U.S. House," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 25-37, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:6:y:1994:i:1:p:25-37

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    Cited by:

    1. Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2016. "Voting and Popularity," CESifo Working Paper Series 6182, CESifo Group Munich.
    2. repec:now:jlqjps:100.00015008 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Knight, Brian, 2017. "An Econometric Evaluation of Competing Explanations for the Midterm Gap," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 12(2), pages 205-239, September.

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