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The Enforcement Dilemma of EU Fiscal Rules

Author

Listed:
  • Georg Kirchsteiger
  • Martin Larch

Abstract

Effective enforcement is an essential element of any fiscal rule. The EU's Stability and Growth Pact has been struggling with this truism since inception. We show that its effectiveness goes beyond the threat of fines. The notion that deficit‐prone member states adopt a more virtuous fiscal behaviour to avert sanctions is overshadowed by the realization that in the event of a major shock virtuous countries will come to their rescue as the survival of the entire system is at stake. Unless the underlying issues are addressed, the effectiveness of any EU fiscal rule remains limited.

Suggested Citation

  • Georg Kirchsteiger & Martin Larch, 2025. "The Enforcement Dilemma of EU Fiscal Rules," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 699-708, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:37:y:2025:i:2:p:699-708
    DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12334
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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