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Will Gradualism Work When Shock Therapy Doesn"t?


  • Vivek H. Dehejia

    (Carleton University and CESifo)


When shock therapy is politically infeasible, will gradualism work? This paper takes up this question by: (i) building a political economy model in which it makes sense; (ii) stating the relevant political economy constraint rigorously; and (iii) analyzing the question in the context of a neoclassical model of adjustment, based on Mussa (1978). The paper answers the question in the affirmative, thus contributing to the scientific and policy literature on the economic analysis of policy reform. Copyright 2003 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Vivek H. Dehejia, 2003. "Will Gradualism Work When Shock Therapy Doesn"t?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 33-59, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:15:y:2003:i:1:p:33-59

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Dewatripont, Mathias & Roland, Gerard, 1995. "The Design of Reform Packages under Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1207-1223, December.
    2. Claessens, Stijn & Djankov, Simeon, 1999. "Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance in the Czech Republic," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 498-513, September.
    3. Cesar Martinelli & Mariano Tommasi, 1993. "Sequencing of Economic Reforms in the Presence of Political Constraints," UCLA Economics Working Papers 701, UCLA Department of Economics.
    4. John Vickers & George Yarrow, 1991. "Economic Perspectives on Privatization," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 111-132, Spring.
    5. Gerard Roland, 1994. "The role of political constraints in transition strategies," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 2(1), pages 27-41, March.
    6. Saunders, Peter, 1995. "Privatization, Share Ownership and Voting," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(01), pages 131-137, January.
    7. M. Dewatripont & G. Roland, 1992. "Economic Reform and Dynamic Political Constraints," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(4), pages 703-730.
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    9. repec:cup:apsrev:v:88:y:1994:i:02:p:399-411_09 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Harper, Joel T., 2002. "The performance of privatized firms in the Czech Republic," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 621-649, April.
    11. Evans, Geoffrey & Whitefield, Stephen, 1995. "The Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(04), pages 485-514, October.
    12. Reisinger, William M. & Miller, Arthur H. & Hesli, Vicki L. & Maher, Kristen Hill, 1994. "Political Values in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania: Sources and Implications for Democracy," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 24(02), pages 183-223, April.
    13. Grigoriev, Serguei E. & Nagaev, Serguei A. & Wörgötter, Andreas, 1994. "Regional Economic Development and Political Attitudes of the Population of Russia: Results for the December 1993 Federal Elections," East European Series 15, Institute for Advanced Studies.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dehejia, Vivek H., 2001. "Optimal restructuring under a political constraint," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(12), pages 1989-2006, December.
    2. Digdowiseiso, Kumba, 2010. "The transition of China and Ussr: A political economy perspective," MPRA Paper 22561, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Shubham Chaudhuri & John McLaren, 2007. "Some Simple Analytics of Trade and Labor Mobility," NBER Working Papers 13464, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Ichiro Iwasaki & Taku Suzuki, 2016. "Radicalism Versus Gradualism: An Analytical Survey Of The Transition Strategy Debate," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(4), pages 807-834, September.
    5. James Dean & Vivek H. Dehejia & Elinor Johansen & Sarah Turney, 2004. "Optimal Globalization and National Welfare," Carleton Economic Papers 04-17, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
    6. Didier Laussel & Philippe Michel & Thierry Paul, 2004. "Intersectoral adjustment and unemployment in a two-country Ricardian model. Une approche par la méthode événementielle," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 70(2), pages 169-192.
    7. Didier LAUSSEL & Philippe MICHEL & Thierry Paul, 2004. "Intersectoral adjustment and unemployment in a two-country Ricardian model," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2004023, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    8. Stephen Cameron & Shubham Chaudhuri & John McLaren, 2007. "Trade Shocks and Labor Adjustment: Theory," NBER Working Papers 13463, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Artuç, Erhan & Chaudhuri, Shubham & McLaren, John, 2008. "Delay and dynamics in labor market adjustment: Simulation results," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 1-13, May.
    10. Mathias Dewatripont & Gérard Roland, 1996. "Transition as a process of large-scale institutional change," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 4(1), pages 1-30, May.
    11. Laurila, Juhani & Singh, Rupinder, 2000. "Sequential reform strategy : The case of Azerbaijan," BOFIT Discussion Papers 8/2000, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F11 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Neoclassical Models of Trade
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations


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