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The Control of CEO Compensation by Institutional Investors: An Empirical Study of Agency Theory in Large U.S. Industrial Corporations

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  • Frank L. Winfrey

Abstract

This paper reviews the organizational control process, its role, and outlines the role of ownership control as applied to executive compensation. The findings from the study suggest that institutional ownership is an important factor in the compensation of CEOs of large U.S. industrial firms. Other factors found to be of consistent influence are firm size and firm profitability.

Suggested Citation

  • Frank L. Winfrey, 1994. "The Control of CEO Compensation by Institutional Investors: An Empirical Study of Agency Theory in Large U.S. Industrial Corporations," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(4), pages 211-224, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:corgov:v:2:y:1994:i:4:p:211-224
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.1994.tb00080.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Andrew Benito & Martin Conyon, 1999. "The Governance of Directors' Pay: Evidence from UK Companies," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 3(2), pages 117-136, June.

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